The decline in the working hours of general practitioners (GPs) is a key factor influencing access to health care in many countries. We investigate the effect of changes in hours worked by GPs on waiting times in primary care using the Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life longitudinal survey of Australian doctors. We estimate GP fixed effects models for waiting time and use family circumstances to instrument for GP's hours worked. We find that a 10% reduction in hours worked increases average patient waiting time by 12%. Our findings highlight the importance of GPs' labor supply at the intensive margin in determining the length of time patients must wait to see their doctor. 
| INTRODUCTION
Primary health care is typically the first point of contact with the health care system and plays an important role in the diagnosis and management of patients' health problems. Concerns about access to primary health care services have been growing in many countries (Sarma, Thind, & Chu, 2011) . In health care markets where there is public or private insurance and patients face zero or below market clearing prices, demand is rationed by waiting times. Consequently, waiting times are a key measure of access to health care (Siciliani & Hurst, 2003) . Delays in receiving primary care result not only in the risk of deterioration of patients' health but also an increase in hospital or emergency department use (Bindman et al., 1995; Cowling et al., 2013; Dolton & Pathania, 2016 ).
An increased prevalence of chronic diseases and ageing populations has led to an increase in the demand for primary care services in many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. At the same time, hours worked by general practitioners (GPs) have declined (Crossley, Hurley, & Jeon, 2009; Kirch & Vernon, 2008; Sarma et al., 2011) . Young doctors are working fewer hours than previous cohorts (Sarma et al., 2011) , and there has been a decline in the hours GPs work, both overall and in direct patient care for males and female GPs (H. Britt et al., 2013; Crossley et al., 2009) . Reductions in hours worked are primarily attributed to the increasing proportion of female doctors, the ageing of the medical workforce, and a shift of preferences over work-life balance (Crossley et al., 2009; Joyce, McNeil, & Stoelwinder, 2006; Kirch & Vernon, 2008; Shrestha & Joyce, 2011) . There is currently little knowledge of how these changes in GP labor supply affect access to primary care in general and waiting times in particular. Medical training is a lengthy and costly process, and there are licensing restrictions on entry into the medical profession, so compared with other labor markets, supply at the extensive margin is relatively inflexible to short-term changes in demand. As a result, reductions in working hours may have important implications for access to primary care services.
In this paper, we use a longitudinal survey of Australian doctors to investigate the extent to which hours worked by GPs affect waiting times for appointments. Waiting times for primary care are a policy concern in several OECD countries including Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and Sweden (Siciliani, Borowitz, & Moran, 2013) but are less studied than hospital waiting times (Cullis & Jones, 1986; Goddard, Malek, & Tavakoli, 1995; Gravelle, Smith, & Xavier, 2003; Iversen, 1993; Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin & Smith, 1999) . The limited literature examining the accessibility to primary care focuses on differences in access by patient age, gender, location, and health (Kontopantelis, Roland, & Reeves, 2010; Muggah et al., 2014; Young, Dobson, & Byles, 2000) . The few studies of primary care waiting times find that patients with higher income and private insurance have shorter waiting times (Roll, Stargardt, & Schreyögg, 2012) . There is a paucity of research on how waiting times in primary care are affected by supply-side factors, which is crucial in designing policies to ensure timely access to GP services.
Our study is the first to examine the impact of hours worked by GPs on the length of time patients wait to see them. The key challenge in identifying the causal impact of hours worked by GPs on waiting times is the potential for unobserved confounders that determine both labor supply of GPs and their patients' waiting time. This is an issue because failing to account for confounders will lead to biased estimates of the impact of hours worked on waiting times. We address the presence of time-invariant confounders, such as GPs' motivation and ability, using a GP fixed effects approach. In order to also account for time-varying unobserved confounders, such as changes in patient case mix, we implement a fixed effect instrumental variables (FEIV) estimation strategy. After accounting for both time-invariant and time-varying unobserved confounding, we find that waiting times do respond to hours worked by GPs: A 10% decrease in the average hours worked by a GP will increase the average waiting time for the GP by 12%. We also find that waiting times are affected by GP attributes such as education and experience, local GP density, and by the socioeconomic status of the local population.
In Section 2, we briefly set out the institutional context, provide a simple model of waiting time and GP labor supply, and use it to guide our estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 provides the estimation results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results and policy implications.
| METHODS

| GPs in Australia
In Australia, GPs are the most commonly accessed primary health service and act as gatekeepers to specialist care. Eighty-three percent of Australians consulted a GP at least once in the previous 12 months in (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017 . Medicare, Australia's tax-financed public insurance scheme, provides a fixed subsidy for each visit to a medical practitioner. GPs can charge fees at or above the rebate, which thus acts as a floor price. Medicare provides financial incentives to GPs to set their fees equal to the rebate for Commonwealth Concession Card holders and children under 16 years of age (Department of Human Services, 2015a), with higher incentives in regional, rural, and remote areas (Department of Human Services, 2016).
1 When they do so, the full cost of GP services is billed directly to Medicare and patients have no out of pocket costs. This practice is known as bulk billing. Over 80% of GP services are bulk billed (Department of Health, 2017). Some practices bulk bill all or most of their patients, and others bulk bill only a small proportion of their patients, typically in more affluent areas (Gravelle, Scott, Sivey, & Yong, 2016) . Patients are free to visit any GP as there is no compulsory patient list or registration system. Most GPs work in privately owned group practices with other GPs, practice nurses, and allied health professionals. In 2015-2016, around 67% of GPs were working in practices of five or more GPs, and on average, there were 7.5 GPs per practice (H. Britt et al., 2016 
| Waiting time and GP hours worked
We outline a simple model of the market for GP consultations. 2 Given high bulk billing rates, we assume that the GP bulk bills all patients, who therefore face a zero price.
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Demand for consultations with the GP is
where w is waiting time and q is a measure of the GP's quality. x d is a vector of exogenous demand shifters-such as income, education, health status, and the age distribution of the local population. It also includes other exogenous factors such as availability of emergency departments and other GPs. ϵ d captures unmeasured factors that shift demand. On the supply side, GP works h hours per week. We assume that consultation length t is fixed so that the supply of consultations per week is n = h/t. The assumption that consultation length is fixed is reasonable in the Australian context given that most general practices follow a fixed appointment scheduling system where patients are booked for 15-to 20-min appointments with the GPs for a standard (Level B) consultation. 4, 5 The GP bulk bills all patients and so receives a fixed Medicare rebate m per patient. She incurs costs c(n, q; x c , ϵ c ) where x c are observed factors affecting costs such as the costs of nurses, allied health and administrative staff, and patient complexity. ϵ c is an unobserved component. GP income is y = y 0 + mn − c(n, q; x c , ϵ c ), where y 0 is exogenous nonwork income. The utility of the GP is
where x g denote GP's personal characteristics such as age, gender, and children and ϵ g is an unobserved preference shifter. The GP chooses her hours h = nt of work to satisfy
and so
Equivalently, given the fixed consultation length, the GP supplies consultations to the point where their marginal cost, including the monetary value of forgone leisure, equals marginal revenue (m),
as in the top panel in Figure 1 . The supply of consultations is
As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 , the market clearing condition is that demand for consultations equals the supply of consultations that is inelastic with respect to waiting time, and demand adjusts via waiting time:
2 See Cheraghi- Sohi et al. (2008); Gandhi, Parle, Greenfield, and Gould (1997); Gerard, Salisbury, Street, Pope, and Baxter (2008) ; Gravelle et al. (2003) ; Martin, Jacobs, Rice, and Smith (2003) ; Scott (2000) ; Scott and Vick (1999) ; Scott, Watson, and Ross (2003); and Turner et al. (2007) for related literature and theoretical models. 3 We test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in Section 4.2. 4 Evidence from Australia as well as United States and Europe indicates that consultation length is determined to a large extent by the nature of the problems managed during the consultation and the characteristics of the patients such as age and gender (H. C. Britt, Valenti, & Miller, 2005; Deveugele, Derese, van den Brink-Muinen, Bensing, & De Maeseneer, 2002; Sayer et al., 2000) . It is also affected by GP characteristics such as age, gender, and medical training, and by practice type and location (Bensing, Roter, & Hulsman, 2003; H. C. Britt et al., 2005; Deveugele et al., 2002) and can be thought as a measure of exogenous practice style (Schurer, Kuehnle, Scott, & Cheng, 2016) . 5 A Level B consultation is defined in the Medicare regulations as follows: Professional attendance involving taking a selective history, examination of the patient with implementation of a management plan in relation to one or more problems OR a professional attendance of less than 20 min duration (H. Britt, Valenti, Miller, & Farmer, 2004) . Level B consultations account for about 80% of all consultations (H. Britt et al., 2004 ; http:// medicarestatistics.humanservices.gov.au/statistics/mbs_group.jsp).
Hence, the equilibrium waiting time is given by
which is decreasing in the supply of GP consultations and increasing in the quality of the GP.
| Econometric strategy
We want to estimate the quasi-reduced form (8) for waiting time and assume a linear form for the waiting time for GP i in year t:
where h it is the average weekly total hours worked by GP i in year t. β 1 is the coefficient of primary interest and is the effect of an hour change in the total hours worked by a GP on the average waiting time to see the GP. To capture the effect of x g , x c , x d , and q from our theoretical model, we include X it , a vector of observed characteristics of the GP, her practice, and the area where it is located. X it also includes a measure of consultation length. GP fixed effects γ i captures time-invariant unobserved GP characteristics. λ t are year fixed effects that control for shocks that affect waiting times for all GPs. The inclusion of GP fixed effects accounts for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that affects both GP's labor supply and waiting time. However, hours worked by GPs may also be correlated with unobserved time-varying confounding factors such as unobserved changes in patient case mix. We therefore instrument hours worked with a set of indicators capturing GP family type. Family circumstances, such as having young dependent children and the working status of the spouse, have been shown in previous studies to be strongly correlated with hours worked (Becker, 1985; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Joyce, Wang, & Cheng, 2015; Schurer et al., 2016) . For these family characteristics to be valid instruments, in addition to being correlated with the GP's hours worked, they should not impact on the demand for GP consultations and hence waiting times through any mechanism other than the hours worked by GPs.
It is unlikely that family circumstances, such as having a young child and a spouse who works full-time, will directly affect demand for consultations with the GP and hence waiting times. However, there might be concern that correlation between waiting times and family characteristics could arise if GPs respond to demand shocks by changing their hours of work and those of their partner. We argue that this is unlikely because decisions about labor supply and fertility are typically made in a life cycle setting and based on lifetime utility (Heckman, 1983; Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986; MaCurdy, 1981; Montgomery & Trussell, 1986) . For this reason, short-term changes in demand for GP services are unlikely to lead to significant changes in spousal labor supply nor are they likely to affect important life cycle decisions such as having children. 6 Evidence from studies of physicians and their partners find that life cycle decisions follow the traditional gendered division of labor in the household: Priority is often given to the career of the male partner even if both partners have the same level of education (Gjerberg, 2003; Schurer et al., 2016; Stamm & Buddeberg-Fischer, 2011; Wang & Sweetman, 2013) . Parenthood is associated with a significant reduction in hours of work for female physicians, whereas for male physicians, the effects of marriage and parenthood are much less evident. This is so for physician/nonphysician and for physician/physician couples (Stamm & Buddeberg-Fischer, 2011; Wang & Sweetman, 2013) . Therefore, we argue that our set of indicators measuring family circumstance are reasonably excluded from the waiting time equation as it is unlikely that demand-side shocks will materially affect the family dynamics.
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We present results for ordinary least squares (OLS), OLS with GP fixed effects, and IV and FEIV models. We compute robust standard errors clustered on individual GP. IV and FEIV are inefficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity. As the Pagan and Hall test suggests that heteroscedasticity is present (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007) , we estimate our model using the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.
| DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
| Data
The data are from the Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL) survey, an annual prospective cohort study of workforce participation, labor supply, and its determinants among Australian doctors. The survey provides exceptionally rich data on doctors' workload, qualifications, practice settings, personal characteristics, geographic location, and family circumstances (Joyce et al., 2010) . For the first wave in 2008, a total of 54,750 doctors (the population of all doctors in Australia) across four broad groups within the medical workforce were invited to participate. The response rate was 19.36% with a total of 10,498 doctors in the baseline cohort, which includes 3,906 GPs, 4,597 specialists, 1,072 specialists-in-training, and 924 hospital non-specialists. Joyce et al. (2010) found the 2008 cohort to be representative of the overall doctor population with respect to age, gender, geographic location, and hours worked.
In each subsequent wave of MABEL, all doctors who had previously completed a survey plus a cohort of new doctors were invited to participate. Attrition of the 2008 cohort in 2014 is 49.9%. Attrition is higher in subsequent cohorts, between 53% and 69%, mainly because these cohorts largely consisted of doctors new to clinical practice who tend to have lower response rates generally and are less likely to participate longitudinally. The MABEL attrition rates are lower than other medical workforce surveys, both nationally and internationally (such as the U.S. Community Tracking Study; Taylor, Scott, & Leahy, 2015) .
We use data on GPs from the first seven waves of MABEL (2008 MABEL ( -2014 . The outcome of interest is waiting time for an appointment with the GP, measured in days.
8 Because we use self-reported data on waiting times, there might be a concern regarding measurement error. We argue that, because there are no waiting time targets for primary care
6 Table A3 presents the transition probabilities of GPs moving into different family types. They are broadly in line with traditional life cycle behavior.
For example, single GPs with no children who change type are most likely to acquire a child and no partner in the next period, and next most likely to acquire a partner and have no dependent children. GPs with a nonworking partner and dependent children are most likely to change type to having dependent children and a partner who works part time. 7 Notice that in the theoretical model of Section 2.2 that neither demand factors nor waiting time to see the GP affect the utility of GPs or their income.
Hence, GP hours do not vary with demand shocks. Rather, demand shocks lead only to changes in waiting time. In Figure 1 , the supply curve of consultations is vertical in (w,n) space. For demand shocks to affect hours worked (and hence waiting times) requires that the GP cares directly about patient waiting times.
physicians in Australia, GPs have no systematic incentives to over-report or under-report their waiting times. Therefore, any measurement error in waiting times is likely to be random, so that estimates will be unbiased and consistent.
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We use total hours worked per week as the measure of labor supply. In addition to total hours worked, GPs are asked to report the number of hours worked in different settings and on different activities. 10 We exclude GP-year observations if the difference between the total number of working hours reported across different settings and the reported weekly total hours worked is five or more hours. We then exclude GP-year observations if reported weekly total hours worked are below 4 hr or exceed 75 hr. Finally, we form our baseline estimation sample by excluding GP-year observations if the reported waiting time for an appointment was greater than 30 days.
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As instruments for hours worked, we use a set of indicator variables for GP's family circumstances based on whether the GP has a partner, the employment status of the partner, the number of children, and the age of the youngest child.
The estimation sample is restricted to GPs with nonmissing information on all relevant variables and who have at least two observations across the seven waves. The analysis sample size is 14,544 observations on 3,561 GPs. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. The average waiting time for a GP is 4.02 days, and the average total hours worked per week is 37.54. Half of the GPs in the estimation sample are women. The majority of GPs are Australian medical graduates (74%), their average length of a standard (Level B) consultation is 15.82 min, and they bulk bill 61% of their patients.
13 Most GPs are salaried or contracted employees (57%) and practice in cities (67%).
Around 11% of GPs have dependent children aged under 5 years, and 50% have a partner who is either not working or working part-time.
The last two columns of Table 1 show that although the variation between different GPs is larger than variation within GPs (over time), there is still considerable within variation for waiting time and total hours worked to support fixed effects analysis. There is little variation, between or within GPs, in the consultation length with the average varying less than 4 minutes between GPs and less than 2 minutes for a GP over time. This indicates that most GPs have a standard consultation between 15 and 20 minutes, supporting our assumption of exogeneity of consultation length. There is nontrivial within variation in the family characteristics we use as instruments. Table A3 reports GP transition probabilities between different family types. Each year, about 17% of single GPs in the data become partnered. From one year to the next, about 20% of GPs with a partner who is either not working or working part-time and who have a dependent child aged under 5 see their child turn 5 and age out of this category. Further, for a sizeable proportion of GPs, the partner's work status changes from not working to working part-time, or from working part-time to either not working or working full-time from one year to the next.
The estimation sample has broadly similar characteristics to the GP population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015) except that it has a larger proportion of female GPs (50% against 40% in the GP population), which may account for the average total hours worked per week being lower than the population average (37.54 against 42.7 hr in the population over [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . 14 4 | REGRESSION RESULTS Table 2A presents results from estimating Equation (9). We focus on reporting estimates of the coefficient of interest β 1 , the impact of hours worked on waiting time. The OLS estimate (Column 1) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient on total hours worked, implying that a decrease in hours worked by a GP is associated with lower waiting times. However, once we control for GP fixed effects (Column 2), the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2A present the results from IV and FEIV estimation. The C or GMM distance test of endogeneity confirmed the endogeneity of total hours worked in both IV and FEIV models, with the null of exogeneity rejected at 1% level of significance. The IV model (Column 3) exploits the between-GP variation and has a coefficient of −0.066 on total hours worked, suggesting that a 1-hour decrease in average total hours worked per week is associated with a rise in average waiting time of 0.066 day, which is a 1.64% increase relative to the mean waiting time (4.02 days). This estimate implies that a 10% (or 3.75 hr) reduction in hours worked would increase the average waiting time by 6.2%. The FEIV model (Column 4) is our preferred model because it additionally exploits within-GP variation. The estimated coefficient of −0.125 on total hours worked implies that a 10% reduction in average total hours worked per week would increase the average waiting time by 11.7%.
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The instruments are stronger in the IV model (excluded instruments F statistic = 41.09, p < 0.000, partial R 2 = 0.048
in Column 3 of Table 2A ) than in the FEIV model (excluded instruments F statistic = 17.16, p < 0.000, partial R 2 = 0.018 in Column 4 of Table 2A ) because overall variation is greater than within-GP variation in the data. 17 Both IV and FEIV models pass the underidentification test. Table 2B presents the results for the first stage total hours worked regression. As expected, having dependent children aged under 5 years is associated with a significant reduction in total hours worked, and this negative effect is greater for those whose partner works full-time. The effect of GP, practice, and area characteristics are consistent across the models. GPs who spend more time per patient, who graduated from an Australian medical school or have a postgraduate qualification or fellowship of a college, have higher waiting times. This suggests that patients associate these characteristics with higher quality. Tenure in practice is also found to be positively associated with waiting times, with waiting times increasing with tenure but at a decreasing rate suggesting that patients prefer to consult GPs who have been in the practice for longer.
GPs who are employees (contracted/salaried or working as locum) have lower waiting times compared with GPs who are principals or partners in the practice. The coefficient on the number of nurses is positive and significant, suggesting that practices with high waiting times might be employing more nurses.
18 Regional and remote areas have higher waiting 14 Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics separately for female and male GPs. 15 Means of GP time-varying variables added to a random effects specification were jointly significant at 1%, suggesting that fixed effects is the appropriate specification (Wooldridge, 2010) . 16 We also estimated models varying the waiting time cutoffs used to define the sample by (a) dropping the top and bottom 1%, (b) dropping observations with waiting times over 25 days (rather than 30), and (c) dropping observations with waiting times over 15 days. The results (Table A6) are qualitatively similar to the baseline model (hours worked remain highly statistically significant and the instruments strong), though the effect of hours worked is reduced by about two fifths in the sample with the tightest (15 days) waiting time cutoff.
times compared with major cities. GPs in higher socioeconomic areas have lower waiting times, which is consistent with the waiting time literature (Cooper, McGuire, Jones, & Le Grand, 2009; Laudicella, Siciliani, & Cookson, 2012; Roll et al., 2012; Sharma, Siciliani, & Harris, 2013; Siciliani & Verzulli, 2009; Sudano & Baker, 2006) . GPs located closer to emergency departments have higher waiting times. This seems counter-intuitive because a proportion of emergency department patients have non-urgent conditions that could be dealt with by a GP. A possible explanation is that emergency departments are using triage systems where patients who are classified as "non-urgent" are redirected from the emergency department (ED) to co-located primary care services (Carson, Clay, & Stern, 2010 ; Government of Western Australia, 2004). This might lead to increases in workload and waiting times at the co-located primary care practices, especially as there is no patient registration with GP practices in Australia, so that patients turned away from ED can go to the closest practice. 
| Alternative measures of labor supply
We estimated models with two alternative measures of GP labor supply. First, we use hours worked in direct patient care as the measure of labor supply. Second, to investigate the sensitivity of results to the specification of consultation length, we estimate models using the number of patients (visits) seen per week rather than hours worked.
20 Table 3 presents the results from IV and FEIV models. The baseline results (using total hours worked per week as the measure of labor supply) are repeated in Panel C. The results using hours worked in direct patient care (Panel A) are qualitatively similar to the baseline results; however, the magnitude of the effect is slightly higher, possibly because the explanatory variable has a slightly smaller scale. The instruments are weaker for direct patient hours, particularly in FEIV model (Panel A, Column 2) perhaps because hours spent in direct patient care might be affected by other factors in the practice as well as by family circumstances.
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The number of patients (visits) seen per week is negatively and significantly associated with waiting times for the IV model (Panel B, Column 1). The estimate from the IV model suggests that if a GP sees one patient less a week, the average waiting time would increase by 13 min, slightly less than the average length of a consultation. The instruments are weak for the FEIV model ( F = 6.428) possibly due to smaller within-GP variation in the number of patients seen (within-GP variation is just 23 patients compared with between-GP variation of around 53 patients).
| Bulk billing
In our theoretical model, we assumed that GPs bulk bill all patients. We examine the sensitivity of our results to the extent of bulk billing by estimating models separately for the sample of GPs who bulk bill 80% or more of their patients 19 As a robustness check, we estimated the baseline models excluding the minimum distance to ED variable from the analysis and found the estimates were almost unchanged. 20 We could not find any instrument for consultation length (t) and hence could not formally test for endogeneity of t.
21 Both C or GMM distance test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicated that hours worked in direct patient care are endogenous at 5% level. and those who bulk bill less than 80% of their patients. 22 The results are reported in Panel A of Table 4 . For GPs bulk billing 80% or more of their patients, we still find a negative and statistically significant relationship between total hours worked and waiting times for the IV model (Panel A, Column 1), and the magnitude is somewhat larger than in the baseline IV results (Panel D, Column 1). In the FEIV model, the instruments are weak and estimates are imprecise perhaps because the number of GPs in the subsample is small. For GPs bulk billing less than 80% of their patients, we find a negative and statistically significant effect of total hours worked on waiting times for the FEIV model that is similar to that in the baseline model. As a further robustness check, we also estimated the baseline model for the full sample but excluding the bulk billing variable from the analysis and found that results were almost unchanged (see Table A5 ).
| Female and male GPs
Female GPs work fewer hours on average (31.64 hr) than male GPs (43.35 hr) and have higher average waiting times (4.28 days against 3.76 days for male GPs). Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics by gender. It shows that female and male GPs are also different in several other characteristics controlled for in our baseline analysis. Estimating models separately for female and male GPs allows analysis on a more homogenous sample of GPs who are more likely to be similar in their unobservable characteristics that might affect demand for consultations and waiting times. Table 4 Panel B presents the results for female and male GPs. The coefficient on total hours worked is negative in both IV and FEIV models for both female and male GPs. For female GPs, the IV model has negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on total hours worked (−0.042), whereas the FEIV model has significantly negative but smaller in magnitude (compared with baseline result) coefficient on total hours worked. For male GPs, the instruments are weak in both IV and FEIV models and hence the estimates are likely to be biased. Table A4 reports the separate first stage results for female and male GPs. Compared with the first stage results for all GPs (Table 2B) , the F statistics on the excluded IVs for female GP labor supply is similar to the baseline models but considerably smaller for male GPs. For female GPs, both young dependent children and working status of the spouse are associated with labor supply decisions. For example, having dependent children aged under 5 years and a partner who works full-time is associated with a reduction in total hours worked per week of about 13 hours as compared with a single female GP without young dependent children. The instruments work well for female GPs.
We find that employment status of the spouse plays a negligible role in the labor supply decisions of male GPs and their labor supply response to having children is also weak. 23 However, there is a significant negative association between male GP hours and having dependent children aged under 5 years and a partner who works full-time compared with a single male GP without young dependent children. Although the family circumstance instruments might be working for some male GPs in the sample, overall, the instruments are weak for male GPs hours and hence estimates are likely to be biased.
24 22 We did not restrict the sample to GPs who bulk bill 100% of their patients due to very small sample size to perform the analysis. 23 A recent study on Australian GPs also found that male GPs do not significantly alter their labor supply in response to having children (Schurer et al., 2016) . 24 We were unable to find any other instruments for male GP hours and so could not further test for and correct endogeneity of male GP hours. *Significance at 10%. **Significance at 5%. ***Significance at 1%.
| Employee versus self-employed GPs
Next, we examine whether the results are driven by GPs who are principals/partners or associates in the practice and who therefore have greater control over working hours. The results from separate models for GPs who are employees and for principal/partner GPs are in Table 4 Panel C. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results. For employee GPs, we still find a negative and statistically significant effect of hours worked on waiting times for both IV and FEIV models, although the magnitude of the effect is slightly smaller compared with the baseline results. Due to the small sample size of self-employed GPs, the instruments are weak and the estimates of the effects of hours worked are imprecise.
| CONCLUSION
This study is the first to examine the extent to which the labor supply of GPs at the intensive margin affects access to primary care, as measured by waiting times. Our analysis takes into account both time-invariant and time-varying unobserved confounding factors potentially correlated with both hours worked by GPs and their waiting times. Controlling for demand-side factors, we find that a 10% reduction in the average hours worked by a GP would increase the average time a patient waits to see the GP by 12%. Our results have implications for policy to improve access to primary care. They suggest that the current trend of declining working hours of GPs, primarily driven by increasing feminization of medical workforce and a shift in preference for working predictable and fewer hours, is likely to lead to longer waiting times for patients.
In several OECD countries, policymakers have focused on encouraging general practices to provide extended working hours in an attempt to improve access. For example, in the United Kingdom, the government launched 7-day opening of GP practices in 2013 (Dolton & Pathania, 2016) , and in Australia, the government provides financial incentives 23 A recent study on Australian GPs also found that male GPs do not significantly alter their labor supply in response to having children (Schurer et al., 2016) . 24 We were unable to find any other instruments for male GP hours and so could not further test for and correct endogeneity of male GP hours. Note. The table presents the coefficients on the total hours worked per week. In FEIV models, the number of observations was lesser due to the exclusion of singleton groups when sample is restricted to GPs bulk billing 80% or more patients (430 observations dropped), bulk billing less than 80% patients (393 observations dropped), and when sample is divided into employed (246 observations dropped) and self-employed GPs (310 observations dropped). Complete tables are available on request. F statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in square brackets. FEIV: fixed effect instrumental variables; GP: general practitioner.
*Significance at 10%. **Significance at 5%. ***Significance at 1%.
for GPs to offer additional after-hours coverage to patients (Department of Human Services, 2015b). However, evidence from stated preference studies suggests that financial incentives will have little impact on increasing the total hours worked by GPs (Broadway, Kalb, Li, & Scott, 2017; Kalb, Kuehnle, Scott, Cheng, & Jeon, 2015) . And in the absence of an increase in the number of GPs, reallocating the supply of their hours worked across the week could increase waiting times during normal weekday GP office hours. This suggests that policies that operate on the extensive margin will be required. Many countries, including Australia, have recruited medical graduates from overseas to increase GP supply in the short term (World Health Organization, 2010) . In the long term, countries often use a mix of immigration and other policies aimed at improving retention and increasing domestic training, to address structural imbalances between supply and demand (OECD, 2008 (OECD, , 2016 .
A third possibility is to improve access to primary care by changing the mix of primary care health workers. Some studies suggest that primary care capacity could be increased by shifting care from doctors to nurses (Bodenheimer & Smith, 2013; Ghorob & Bodenheimer, 2012) . However, high-quality evaluations of the impact of nurses on primary care capacity and access to primary care services are still scarce (Laurant et al., 2005) .
Finally, a further policy response to increase GP labor supply could be to improve childcare options available to them. As demonstrated by the results for our first stage labor supply models and corroborated by evidence from several OECD countries, childbearing reduces female doctors' labor supply (British Medical Association, 2015; Cleland, Johnston, Anthony, Khan, & Scott, 2014; Wang & Sweetman, 2013) . It is currently unclear the extent to which access to childcare impacts the labor supply decisions of female doctors, but this would appear to be an important avenue for further research. Note. The table only presents the coefficients on the total hours worked per week. In all models, the outliers/cutoffs for total hours worked are defined as the baseline specification, that is, GP-year observations were excluded if total hours worked per week were below 4 hr or greater than 75 hr. Complete tables are available on request. F statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in square brackets. FEIV: fixed effect instrumental variables; GP: general practitioner.
